



REJOINDER TO GORDON AND NJOYA ON ISRAEL AND LIBERTARIANISM

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Abstract:

*Block and Futerman (2021) maintain that the classical liberal political-economic philosophy, when properly understood, strongly supports Israel. Gordon and Njoya (2024) disagree and criticize the thesis of the two present authors. Gordon and Njoya (hence, GN) offer several arguments. For one thing, they maintain that we are mistaken in asserting a connection as we do between John Locke, libertarian theoretician of homesteading and private property rights, and Zionism. Our friendly critics aver that contrary to the title of our book, *The Classical Liberal Case for Israel*, we are simply making, instead, a typical or ordinary Zionist case to this end. GN also charge us with taking the position “that the legitimacy of the only Jewish state should not be questioned if the legitimacy of all other states is accepted.” Our learned colleagues hold the view that we “... consider that principles of property law are the only relevant benchmark by which a libertarian may ascertain war guilt. “All four of the present authors are staunch Rothbardians (we do not agree with him on this issue). Perhaps the widest divergence between the present authors and GN is the following: They opine that we “have misfired in (our) claim that Rothbard’s views of Zionism reflect a mistaken application of libertarian principles.” The present paper is our response to these criticisms of our book made by Gordon and Njoya.*

Keywords: *Israel; Classical Liberalism; war; Hamas; Libertarianism*

REJOINDER TO GORDON AND NJOYA ON ISRAEL AND LIBERTARIANISM

It is an honor and a pleasure to respond to Gordon and Njoya (2024). They are very careful commentators. They are fair-minded, polite,

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decent, accurate, and scholarly.¹ Nevertheless, we do disagree with their assessments of our major publication² on this subject with regard to several important substantive issues having to do with the imbroglio in the Middle East and here are our counterarguments.

First, it is of notice that GN do not necessarily oppose Israel. Quite the opposite, they claim that “It is true, as Ayn Rand argued in her own defense of Israel, that liberty is likely to be advanced more by Israel than by the Arab states...” But GN certainly oppose the way we construct our argument, as well as our focus, in defending Israel.

GN declare that “the main thrust” of divergence between the present authors and our mentor, Murray Rothbard, has to do with Zionism. We are not sure about the “main thrust,” but we certainly acknowledge that this is at least one of the important ways in which we depart from Mr. Libertarian.

In the view of GN: “It is fair to say that Jabotinsky is known less for championing Lockean principles of private property and free markets than for championing the right of Jewish people to a homeland and to defend that homeland by force if necessary.”

This is undoubtedly true. However, it is our contention that the two, Lockean principles of homesteading, and the right of Jews to the land they have homesteaded, lead in the same direction, ending up with the same conclusion. And Jabotinsky was indeed a classical liberal although he is far more well-known as a Zionist thinker and champion (Jabotinsky, 1923). The fact that the former is “less known” is irrelevant to its truth.

Let us demonstrate as an example of Jabotinsky’s regard for Classical Liberalism his letter to author Charles Vernon Bartlett, on December 9, 1938:³

“Dear Mr. Bartlett,”

“Mr. S. Jacobi introduced me to you in 1934, and I faintly hope that you have some recollection of the fact.”

“My colleagues and I shall probably soon have to approach you on matters concerning Palestine; but this letter is personal and has a different purpose.”

“Are you interested in the revival of Liberalism, the old-fashioned creed of the XIX-th century? I feel its time is coming; I think in about 5 years it will have enthusiastic crowds of youth to back it, and its catch-words will be repeated all the world over with the same hysteria as those of Communism used to be 5 years ago, those of Fascism to-day; only the effect will be deeper, as Liberalism has roots in human nature which all barrack-room religions lack.”

“If you are interested, and perhaps know of some budding initiative to act in this direction and to sponsor the launching of a militant or crusading Liberalism, I should like to help.”

“I understand some Jewish opponents of my brand of Zionism pretend to suspect me of being pro-Fascist. I am just the opposite: an instinctive hater of all kinds of Polizei-Staat, utterly skeptical of the value of discipline and power and punishment, etc. down to economic dirigée.”

“It is hardly necessary to add that, in speaking of Liberalism, I do not mean any British party but simply that philosophy which, shared by men of many parties in many countries, made the XIX-th century great.”

“I should be more than glad to hear from you on this subject.”

GN cite Simons quoting Jabotinsky as follows: “We do not have to account to anybody. We are not to sit for anybody’s examination and nobody is old enough to call on us to answer. We came before them and will leave after them. We are what we are, we are good for ourselves, we will not change, nor do we want to.”

¹ This is in sharp contrast to Hoppe (2024). We are thus very appreciative of the graciousness, and scholarly manner with which GN treat us. Our response to Hoppe’s “over the top” attack on us is Futerman and Block, Forthcoming.

² See on this Block and Futerman (2021)

³ Moreover, observe not only *what* he says but also at what *time* in history he says so.

But this hardly leads GN to where we presume they want to go: to drive a wedge between Lockean, e.g., libertarian homesteading, and Jabotinsky. This quote is merely a baring of the teeth.⁴ It is entirely compatible with an announcement that Jewish land claims are justified by the homesteading principles of classical liberalism and that Jewish Zionists will defend them to the utmost.

GN argue as follows: “Indeed as Block and Futerman observe, the case they make is essentially a Zionist case in this broader sense and not merely a case based on Lockean homesteading...”

But why cannot it be both? Why cannot it be both, on our part, equally? GN try to drive a wedge between Zionism and the homesteading theory of classical liberalism. To be sure, they are successful, insofar as the two are not at all identical. However, picture a Venn Diagram, where one element is labeled “red,” and the other “round.” Now, redness and roundness are entirely different concepts. Their overlap, in contrast, is something both red and round, such as a red-colored ball.

In a similar manner, now draw a Venn Diagram in which the two elements are, respectively, Jabotinsky-Zionism and Lockean-libertarian-homesteading. The two pairs here, have a bit more in common than red and round, even GN would presumably admit that. But their overlap is crucially important, and this is the point that GN miss, in our view. They triumphantly point to the admitted differences between the latter two pairs. We accept them, but look, also, at their overlap.

Briefly, Zionism is the national liberation movement of the Jewish People, *in their ancestral homeland*. The latter aspect is what links Zionism with the Lockean tradition. If only the first part were of relevance, a Jewish State could have been formed elsewhere. But Zionism’s core is the idea that the Jewish people really developed and thrived in the land of Israel, as well as homesteaded much of it. The Jews were expelled two millennia ago but always wanted to get back to *their* land.

No, we do not say, as GN attribute to us, “that the legitimacy of the only Jewish state should not be questioned if the legitimacy of all other states is accepted.” Rather, the legitimacy of all governments should be questioned, from the anarcho-capitalist perspective, and all should be found seriously wanting. However, the present authors have tried to take seriously the challenge put forth by Rothbard (1967). To question the Israeli government per se, and/or any other government for being a state totally ignores this scholar’s challenge not to engage in “sectarianism.” We want to compare the government of Israel with all other such entities, to determine which is worse than the others, and which is better. In other words, which one is closer to the NAP (non-aggression principle), and which one is further from it. This is a point of which GN are not fully cognizant as they should be, as it is so central to our analysis.

No truer words were ever said than these by GN: “... it is primarily on this point, on the concept of private property, that they (the present authors) clash with Rothbard. They do not simply wish to defend Zionism, but to argue that opposing Zionism amounts to opposing private property rights in general.”

However, we cannot quite see our way clearly to agreeing with this assessment of GN’s: “The authors consider that principles of property law are the only relevant benchmark by which a libertarian may ascertain war guilt.”

Yes, they are indeed highly “relevant” to our deliberations, but they are only a (big, to be sure) part of the story. But they are far from being the “only” benchmark. Also of great (and greatest) applicability is the inveterate hate of Jews exhibited by Arabs in general and Palestinian Arabs in particular. The pogrom of 1929 in Hebron had nothing to do so with “property law.”

Nor does this remarkable statement have anything to do so with “property law”: “The Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews) when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him...”⁵ There is also the issue

⁴ Would the “peaceniks” in the present Israeli Knesset show half as much spirit as this man?

⁵ A quote from Islamic sources in the Hamas Covenant (1988).

that Hamas uses its children as shields. None of this is at all irrelevant, as GN would have it.

State GN: "Block and Futerman argue that in War Guilt Rothbard is addressing the wrong issue. Their view is that rather than questioning whether Israel is more guilty than her Arab neighbors (to which their answer is no), Rothbard should instead ask who homesteaded the land of Israel 3,000 years ago. This would lead him to the correct conclusion: that Israel is the true owner and is thus justified in using force to seize back and defend her land."

We must give GN at least partial credit for accuracy. This is indeed one of our claims. However, these reviewers of our 2021 book only tell part of the story here. In addition to the Jews having a far better claim to having homesteaded land under dispute three millennia ago, there is also the issue that even within the last century or two Arab land claims are highly suspect on libertarian homesteading grounds, since a preponderance of them were given to them by governments (British, Ottoman) and were not at all homesteaded, since they consisted of non-cultivated, non-homesteaded swamps and desert (considered *uncultivable* at the time). In contrast, the Hebrews "made the desert bloom" in the land they could purchase (and subsequently more once the State of Israel was born). They, in sharp contrast, and for the most part did indeed engage in homesteading the land that was considered theirs. So, it is not only the case that most of the land was owned by the government (either Ottoman or British) and not by Arabs, but also much of the land that was considered Arab was not homesteaded by them (some, of course, did, *but not all*).

State GN: "The authors' charge against Rothbard is therefore that he does not delve deep enough into the annals of history to ascertain the first owner of the land of Israel." Yes, that is indeed one of our criticisms against Rothbard. But this certainly does not exhaust our charges, as GN imply.

GN claim that "the (present) authors have misfired in their claim that Rothbard's views of Zionism reflect a mistaken application of libertarian principles ... But the(se) authors fail to appreciate that the ... beliefs and goals of Zionism are, at best, only tangentially related to libertarian theories concerning just land titles."

We return the compliment. We maintain that it is GN who have "misfired." These book reviewers of ours are mistakenly trying to ascribe to us a position we do not hold. We do not at all maintain any sort of identity between Zionism and the Lockean homesteading theories of libertarianism. We only hold that there is an overlap between these two very different perspectives on this one issue: land titles in contested areas in the Middle East. In very much the same way there is an overlap between the theory of private property rights and the role of market prices. The latter cannot exist without the former, but neither is reducible, let alone identical, to the other. It is in this sense that opposing Zionism is to oppose private property rights in general, because Zionism is the idea that Jews return to *their land*. If it is theirs (and it is), that is a question to be treated by a different approach, because it is empirical rather than theoretical. But, *if* it is their land, then according to Classical Liberalism and libertarianism, it is just that they hold it. Of course, Zionism does not equal Classical Liberalism and libertarianism, they are different political philosophies.

GN assert, quite correctly, that "Neither of the protagonists fighting over disputed land in the Middle East can credibly claim to be fighting for libertarian principles." True enough. However, the position of one of these "protagonists," the Israelis, is far more *compatible* with "libertarian principles" than the other, the Palestinian Arabs. Also, one of the main charges of the latter against the former is that the former "expelled them and expropriated them", i.e. an argument ultimately dealing with property rights.⁶ That is all we set up to prove, and that is all we have succeeded in proving. In other words, GN are taxing us with failure to

⁶ This does not mean that they are essentially *motivated* by it, only that they rationalize their hatred in this way. In other words, anti-Zionists do not oppose Israel for property rights reasons but use alleged property rights violations ("massive expropriation and expulsion") to

build the narrative that they use to legitimize their attacks. These occurred throughout history, long before property rights became relevant with the birth of this country in 1948.

demonstrate something not totally unrelated, but not exactly on point. Yes, we agree with these critics, we have indeed failed to do that which we had no intention of accomplishing in the first place.

Moreover, if the main charge against Israel is on alleged property rights violations, that means that we can refute it by analyzing the property rights situation at the time. But that does not mean that we will convince anti-Zionists, who are motivated by something else, namely, opposition to Jewish presence in the area as such. No anti-Zionist in the West claims to be against Israel because it is full of Jews (in the Arab world they are far more honest) but say, instead, that they oppose the "Zionist entity" that "robbed and expelled Palestinians from their lands and olive gardens." We recognize that this is just an excuse, but we must nevertheless refute the "expropriation" argument. We must do so not only to show that it is a lie but also to show why there is a very powerful Classical Liberal case for Israel.

Our recognition of Arab aggression as the source of the conflict can be seen in several places in our book. As we claim in p. 367:

"Suppose Israel had started in 1948, with exactly 7% of the land that Rothbard, [...] concede was legitimately-owned Jewish land. Let us now engage in a bit of contrary-to-fact history. What would the Arab reaction have been to this 'legitimate' state of Israel? It is not too great a leap into the dark to posit that they would have reacted under this science fiction-type assumption in the same manner they actually did at that time. That is, the nations of Syria, Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen would have attacked this fledgling new nation. Perhaps, even more avidly, since this 'legitimate' nation would have been even weaker. The Arabs regarded the Jews as a viper in their bosom. Evidence for this contention lies in the numerous riots and pogroms staged by the former against the latter long before the creation of the Jewish state in 1948."

Next, GN assert: "Whatever that theory of justice is, property rights based on ethnicity, DNA, and

genetic entitlement to ancestral lands corroborated by religious texts and cultural inheritance is not a libertarian theory of private property rights."

We beg to differ. What these excellent libertarian theoreticians are in effect claiming is that only if there were an "individual Jew who can trace his ownership rights over any specific piece of land from 2000 years ago" would this assertion of ownership pass muster under "a libertarian theory of private property rights." They are asserting in effect that individualism is the be-all and end-all of land rights and that collectivism is not merely second in rank, but entirely invalid. How, then, do they deal with native Indian claims to own territory? Such tribes of people, collectives if you will, long predated the arrival of the Europeans. Based upon GN's theory of libertarian property rights, they would not have owned even one square inch of this territory, since they did not homestead even so much on an individualistic basis. Rather, they did so collectively. Where is it written in graven stone that only the homesteading acts of individuals can garner property rights, but that if it is done by collectives, such as Indian tribes, it plain just does not count at all? Nowhere, is our contention. On the other hand, if GN can now see their way clearly to validate Indian claims to property, it is difficult to see how they can avoid this conclusion in the case of the Jewish "tribe."⁷

Moreover, we never claimed that *every inch* of land belongs to the "Jews" as such because millennia ago they were there (only some of the land controlled by Jews can be justified in that way). That explains *why* they wanted to return, not why they have a right to be in the land of Israel now (which is *because* they created their own country by homesteading it and building it, in an area that was for the most part an uncultivated, un-homesteaded desert). The genetics and cultural connection explain the link between certain modern-day Jews (the *Kohanim*) and specific places such as the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, which is very important because it is a crucial site in the entire "conflict." We do not make that claim for *all* of the land, but the few places that do apply

⁷ GN are herein confusing methodological individualism with political individualism. The former is an aspect of Austrian economics and is apodictically true: only individuals, not groups, can act. Subtract all the

individuals from the group, and there is nothing left. The latter is simply false, as shown by the fact that, surely, the American native peoples owned some land. See on this Crepelle and Block (2017).

are still relevant. Moreover, despite that it is not a fully “libertarian theory of property rights” it is more compatible with it than the alternative: the Temple Mount to be owned by the Islamic Waqf.⁸ In other words, it is an innovative solution *based* on property rights theory for a complex issue such as the Temple Mount ownership. Moreover, how does supporting Jewish homesteading in the land of Israel (Judea) make us non-libertarians but implicitly defending Arab land ownership of an entire un-homesteaded area by fiat (as Rothbard, 1967, does) is libertarian?

In their next at-bat, our reviewers make this statement: “It is true, as Ayn Rand argued in her own defense of Israel, that liberty is likely to be advanced more by Israel than by the Arab states but that does not in itself mean that a defense of Israel is an application of libertarian principles. Rather, that point merely asserts that libertarian principles are more likely to flourish in Israel than in neighboring states.”

Yes, we the present authors strongly agree with this assessment. But we fail to see how this can be a proper criticism, or, even relevant, to our writings. We barely mention Miss Rand in our book (2021) and not at all in anything even approaching this context. However, given that GN raised this issue, we must also say at this point that the fact “that liberty is likely to be advanced more by Israel than by the Arab states” should certainly point in the direction or support a strong suspicion “that a defense of Israel is an application of libertarian principles.” That is so because the opposite idea, to defend the Arab states which would not advance liberty as much as Israel, is in effect to support a less free state of affairs for that area of the Middle East now comprised by Israel. So, in this respect, how could a libertarian *not* support Israel on these grounds alone⁹? If “liberty is likely

to be advanced more by Israel than by the Arab states” then there must be at least *something* in Israel that is in accordance with libertarian principles, and facing the only alternative of other regimes that would not advance liberty as much¹⁰ then a libertarian should support the former. Remember, following Rothbard (1967) we must reject sectarianism, and it is either Israel or the other Arab states (or Iran) that are in the running.

Try as we might, we cannot see our way clearly to agreeing with this statement of GN: “Deciding ... who is more or less to blame for a particular war and who is the true aggressor falls within the purview of historical analysis, foreign policy and the specific details of particular events rather than a theory of just acquisition of property.”

In our view, the “just acquisition of property” is not a necessary condition for determining war guilt, but upon occasion, it can be a sufficient one. As we are forever fond of saying, war guilt in the present Middle Eastern conflagration has other dimensions besides property titles. Greater hatred for Jews than love for their own children on the part of the Arabs plays an important role in this determination. However, titles to property must also be considered in this context, for the Palestinian Arabs claim they were booted off their legitimately owned property, and that when they use violence against the Israelis,¹¹ it is justified on the grounds of repossessing what they think is rightfully theirs.

Let us stipulate, *arguendo* only, that in not allowing the “right of return” for the Arabs who abandoned their property in 1948,¹² Israel did indeed steal their land. For the libertarian critics of Israel, matters are very simple: this stolen land must be returned. Period. But matters are not quite as simple as that. In leaving, many of these Arabs

⁸ Once again, we claimed that a specific group of Jews, the *Kohanim*, are entitled to that very specific piece of property because they are both genetically and culturally linked to the builders, *in the absence of any other group or individual with better claims to it.*

⁹ Emphasis on this last word, alone. That is, we are now operating under strict *ceteris paribus* assumptions. The only thing we now know about the two situations, Arab versus Israeli, is that the latter is more libertarian. Then, of course, we logically entitled to deduce that if Israel is in charge, the situation will be more libertarian than if the opposite occurs.

¹⁰ Rothbardiana is not an option in the area, or pretty much anywhere else either for that matter.

¹¹ Say what you will against these people, it cannot be denied that they are intent on using violence, mainly against women and children, *on both sides*, to attain their ends.

¹² As a summary, the most important of the “New Historians” himself, Benny Morris, explains what happened in 1948 in Morris (2008).

were following the orders of the half-dozen invading armies; they were thus aiding and abetting them. It is thus not at all as clear as supposed that this was a case of land theft.¹³ But we are assuming, for the sake of argument, that it is. However, what about the fact that at around this time and afterward, a similar number of Jews were expelled from the Arab countries busily invading Israel? Why do we not hear even a single peep from anti-Zionist libertarians (including Rothbard) about that particular land (and other property) theft?¹⁴ If there were a Solomon-like libertarian judge, he might well have ruled that the Arabs who left Palestine in 1948 instead of returning to their homes and olive gardens should take over the land of the exiled Jews, and, vice versa, those forced to leave the Arab countries would take over their properties. This massive land swap is an aspect of justice in the realm of the possible, but it completely eludes the (libertarian) critics of Israel. This is mainly because the latter do not even recognize nor mention that a million Jews were massively expelled and expropriated from the countries, they had been living in for millennia just because they were Jews.¹⁵

Here is a claim of GN which, we allow, makes a good point against us, but only because they do not quote the entire sentence we wrote. They offer the following: “The authors clearly disagree with Rothbard on how historical events unfolded but it does not follow that in a disagreement over who aggressed against whom, one party is defending private property while the other is ‘against the entire concept of private property.’ It is merely a debate over contested facts, or at any rate the significance of contested facts, rather than a debate over the concept of private property.”

But we did not write that the Arabs are “against the entire concept of private property,” plain and

simple. It is not true that all Arabs always oppose private property rights. For the most part, they rely upon this concept when it suits their purpose and ignore it when it does not.

Here is an entire paragraph from whence this phrase was lifted, out of context:¹⁶

“The roots of all the hatred against Israel are deeply embedded in anti-Zionism. We would challenge that to be anti-Zionist is to be against the entire concept of private property and inheritance *in a broad sense*. It is high time that the liberty movement, the real and true classical liberals of the world, stand up and take notice. Those who attack Israel are *almost always* enemies of private property and free markets generally” (emphasis added).

Yes, we still insist, GN to the contrary notwithstanding, that *in a broad sense*, the anti-Zionists are *almost always* enemies of private property. GN are excellent reviewers, but on this one occasion, they seriously err.

GN end on this note: “The question of whether Israel has committed acts of aggression is not reduceable to Lockean homesteading principles, nor can the Ethics of Liberty be construed as a manual capable of settling wars between nations. Ultimately, in claiming that the dispute in the Middle East can be resolved through libertarian principles of private property Block and Futerman have lost sight of the complexity of the philosophical issues. They devote attention to showing, for example, the hatred that has historically been shown towards Jews (p. 252-253) but they are wrong to suppose that this is in any way related to a theory of private property and naive to hope that inter-racial hatred can be resolved by reference to property rights.”

¹³ For an analysis of this subject, see Block and Futerman (2021), Chapter 3.

¹⁴ And here the land and property theft was clear. These Jews were not even thought to be dangerous to their countries’ populations in the way that the departing Arabs were in Israel.

¹⁵ And these Jews, unlike Palestinian Arabs condemned by the Arab countries to leave in refugee camps as eternal refugees, resettled (some in Israel, others in the US and other countries) and moved on with their lives (with no compensation whatsoever).

¹⁶ GN do quote us here (but the sense does not change): “The right of the Jewish People to inherit and develop the land of their ancestors is so deeply rooted in historical and cultural evidence that to dispute it is simply a farce. It is tantamount to denying the basic rights of private property in a broad sense. That is what the attack against Israel’s legitimacy essentially is—an attack against private property rights generally, for anybody at all.”

Here is our reaction: We never wrote that whether Israel has committed acts of aggression is reduceable to Lockean homesteading principles. Our position, instead, is that these Lockean homesteading principles are an important determinant of war guilt between Israel and its enemies and that the former's actions, not those of the latter, are far more consistent with them.

We further do not support the claim that "the Ethics of Liberty (cannot) be construed as a manual capable of settling wars between nations." Au contraire, it is a *splendid* manual capable of determining guilt or innocence in wars between nations. The only trouble, here, is that the Rothbard of 1967 did not fully adhere to these principles. If he had given due credit to property rights in certain areas emanating from thousands of years ago, as well as took cognizance of just how weak the Arab property titles of a century ago were,¹⁷ based upon Lockean homesteading grounds he would have taken a position 180 degrees removed from his actual view. This is because, for the most part, the Arabs did not cultivate the swamp and desert they claimed for their own. Had Rothbard incorporated all of this, plus the understanding of the deep hatred against Jews (with or without a state) in the area, he would have come to a very different conclusion about war guilt in the Middle East.

We deny we "have lost sight of the complexity of the philosophical issues." They are not all that complex in this respect. The question is not whether the Jews had a perfect claim on Lockean homesteading grounds to all property under dispute. The issue is, which side had a *better* such claim. When looked at through these eyeglasses, the result is simple, not complex.

GN credit us with devot(ing) attention to showing, for example, the hatred that has historically been shown towards Jews (p. 252-253) but (we) are wrong to suppose that this is in any way related to a theory of private property. But we never "suppose" any such thing, and challenge GN to specify wherein we made any such "supposition."

Rather, it was and still is our view that this is an entirely *separate* matter, totally apart from a theory of property rights, but highly relevant to an explanation as to why there is such turmoil in the Middle East. Property rights enter the picture when analyzing an important aspect of the justice of the cause of each side, especially inspecting the main charge that Palestinian Arabs make to Israel ("expulsion and expropriation"), but not on the origin of the dispute: the Arab rejection of any Jewish presence in the area, especially in the form of a state.¹⁸

As such, we claim over and over in the book, for instance, that:

"... in our view specific historical narratives are merely excuses for the Palestinian Arabs' chronic rejectionist positions against Israel. Their true motive is a rejection of any Jewish presence in the area whatsoever." (Block & Futerman, 70)

"It is first and foremost the Palestinian Arabs rejection of Jews that is the cause of war." (Block & Futerman, 162)

"As Rothbard points out, there were some minority groups that favored a bi-national Jewish-Arab state, but that idea was dismissed not only because the creation of a Jewish state was a vital need for Jews but also because it avoided the main problem, the real cause of conflict: Arab leadership opposition, shared by much of the Arab population, to any Jewish presence in the land, with or without a state." (Block & Futerman, 263)

Our learned reviewers claim we are "naive to hope that inter-racial hatred can be resolved by reference to property rights." But where oh where did we ever say, or even *think* such a preposterous thought? *Could* it be solved that way? Yes, and we can say so.¹⁹ But we do not for a moment believe it is likely. It is as if we were of the opinion that if the Arabs just read John Locke, all would be well. We have been accused of many things in our intellectual careers, but, to channel President Biden, this charge is surely "over the top."

¹⁷ And also considering that most of the land was owned by the government, not by Arabs, and that Palestinian Arabs never had sovereignty over the land either.

¹⁸ See also Pipes (2009).

¹⁹ It constitutes no logical contradiction to assert that pigs can fly and that there are pink-skinned elephants.

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