ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: RUSSIA’S ADAPTATION AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS

Lyudmila Prigoda, Madina Alikaeva, Zoran Čekerevac

Abstract


This study provides a systematic analysis of the effects of sanctions policy on economic stability and the relationship between imposed sanctions and inflationary dynamics across countries. The initial hypothesis posited a direct and uniformly adverse impact of economic isolation on targeted economies; empirical evidence, however, indicates that outcomes are contingent on country‑specific structural characteristics and adaptive capacities. The Russian case illustrates this complexity: despite extensive restrictive measures, the economy has demonstrated resilience through diversification of foreign trade, implementation of import‑substitution policies, and expansion of domestic production, which have supported continued GDP growth in certain periods and mitigated inflationary pressures in key sectors. The analysis further shows heterogeneous sectoral responses to external shocks and highlights the role of institutional, fiscal, and market mechanisms in shaping macroeconomic trajectories under sanctions. These findings caution against blanket assumptions regarding the destructiveness of sanctions and underscore the necessity for policymakers to evaluate sanctions effects on a case‑by‑case basis, considering domestic economic structures, resilience mechanisms, and sectoral vulnerabilities to form more effective international economic policy.

Keywords


Economic sanctions, Sanctions‑induced structural shifts, Inflationary effects, Russian monetary policy, Central bank interest rates, Economic resilience, Geopolitical trade realignment.

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12709/mest.14.14.01.15

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