LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF BRIBERY AND INCITEMENT: A REFORMULATION

Abstract

In the present paper, we propose a reformulation of the libertarian theory of bribery, particularly of Rothbard's account of the briber as an innocent inciter to crime. We discern an incompatibility between Rothbard’s theories of bribery and incitement and side with the latter. This philosopher-economist maintains that only the bribee, not the briber, is guilty of criminal behavior; and also, that while incitement should be legal, aiding and abetting people into committing a crime should be considered illicit in law. But, the briber, in our view, does not merely limit himself to inciting the bribee, he actually aids and abets him. The briber exceeds the role of a mere inciter because he not only exercises his rights of free speech but also pays the bribee for violating the employment contract. Therefore, Rothbard's criterion for being merely an innocent inciter, i.e. that the inciter has nothing further to do with the criminal activities he incited others to perform, is not fulfilled in the case of the briber who also pays the bribee for the contract violation.